Subject Matter Index

Browse cases by legal subject matter and principles

A fundamental premise of interpretation

General principles of interpretation of statutes

How a court should interprete a statute

How a provision of a statute or constitution should be construed in accordance with section 10(4) of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792)

How ambiguous words are construed

How clear and unambiguous words should be construed

How electoral laws should be interpreted

How rules and laws should be interpreted

How rules of court are to be interpreted

How the court should construe a statutory provision where the legislature has not stipulated the consequences for non-compliance

How words or expressions should be construed

Principle of interpretation of statutes which encroach on the rights of subjects

Principles of construction of statutes with respect to retrospectivity

Principles of interpreting a subsidiary legislation in relation to the principal statute

The position of the law where there is a mistake in a statute

The presumption against ousting or restricting the jurisdiction of a superior court

The principle of construing statutes to suit only the true object intended by it

The principle of interpretation where two statutes are in pari materia

The principle of interpreting words which are in pari materia

The principle that a court must always construe a statute ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

The principle that although generally speaking the same word bears the same meaning, it is a rebuttable presumption

The principle that headings and side notes are useful guides in the interpretation of statutes

The principle that rules of court must be read together as a whole

The principle that the interpretation must be nearly as close to the purpose of the maker as is possible

The principle that when the language employed by the legislature in an earlier statute on a particular subject has been departed from in a later statute relating to the same subject, the presumption is that the alteration in the language used in the latter statute must be taken to have been made deliberately

The principle that where provisions in different statutes conflict, there is an implied repeal of the earlier one by the later one

The principle where a statute set out rights and provides a particular remedy for the ventilation of those rights

The principles of interpretation of wide words of a statute

The rule that it is not for the courts to assume a mistake and then seek to correct the assumed mistake

Whether a court, by a process of interpretation, can alter basic provisions of a statute

Whether a judge can import phrases and words into the very enactment being interpreted

Whether additional text may be imported into an enactment in order to give effect to its purpose

Whether another piece of legislation may be consulted in construing legislation

Whether it is permissible to supply omissions in a statute

Whether it is useful to look at earlier Acts and to find out the state of the law prior to the Act which is being construed

Whether the court can remedy a casus omissus

Whether the court can use an aid to the construction of an enactment where the meaning of the enactment is not in issue

Whether the court will import words into clear and unambiguous provisions of a statute

Whether the courts rely on the spirit of statutes when interpreting them

Whether the task of interpretation arises where the words in a statute are plain and unambiguous

Whether there is any need to resort to any other aids of interpretation where the meaning of the words used is plain and obvious

Whether words in a statute bear the usual meaning found in a dictionary

Whether words in a statute should be interpreted according to their dictionary meaning

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