INGALL V MORAN

(1944) JELR 80274 (KB)

King's Bench · 5 Apr 1944 · United Kingdom
·

Other Citations

(1944) 1 All RR 97, [1944] KB 160.

CORAM

SCOTT LJ

Editorial Summary

Ratio: The plaintiff had issued a writ in 1942 as administrator of his deceased son’s estate. However, he did not take out letters of administration until the November. It was said that proceedings instituted by an applicant who at the time had no standing to institute those proceedings were an incurable nullity. The limitation period had by then expired. Held: The grant did not date back to the date of death, and it was too late to issue fresh proceedings or to amend

Core Terms ^Beta

action

rules of the supreme court

valid action

writ

amendment

application

cause of action

claim

common law maxim

conclusion

conversion

court

date

death

deceased lad

defendant

defendant’s application

defendant’s tort

divorce

estate of the deceased

fair compensation

grant

judgment

judgment of the learned county court judge

letters of administration

measure of his damages

moment

november

opinion

original writ of september

persona

personal writ

plaintiff

plaintiff’s failure

pleadings

president of the probate

prima facie

production of the non-existent letters of administration

representative action

respect

rights of defence

scott lj

september

shadow of title

son’s surviving

subsequent proceedings

such loss of expectation of life

supposed action

time of writ

title

SCOTT LJ (reading the judgment)

‘The cause of action arose, and was vested in the deceased lad, at the moment when he was injured, and the measure of his damages included fair compensation for such loss of expectation of life as was caused to him by the defendant’s tort. That chose in action was his. To it the common law maxim ‘Actio personalis moritur cum persona’ would have applied on his death but for the Act of 1934 which caused it to survive. If he had left a will, it would at the moment of his death automatically have vested in his executor. As he died intestate, it vested in the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, and remained in him until letters of administration were issued. Then – and not before – it would automatically pass from the President to the administrator. As the writ was issued on September 17, 1942, and there was no grant till November, it follows, necessarily, that at the time of writ issued the plaintiff had no shadow of title to his son’s …