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ABOT GYANG & PAM NAFAM
V.
THE QUEEN

JELR 83073 (WACA)

West Africa Court of Appeal West Africa [For WACA cases]
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Case Details

Judges:FOSTER-SUTTON, P., DECOMARMOND, AG. C.J. (NIGERIA), AND COUSSEY, J.A.
Counsel:Akinyele Martins for Appellants. F. Williams, Crown Counsel, for the Crown.
Other Citations:1952 14 WACA 584-586

Foster-Sutton, P. Both of the prisoners in this case applied for leave to appeal from a conviction for murder. The facts are fully discussed in the judgment of the learned trial Judge, Bennett, Ag. J. It is therefore sufficient to say that the substance of the case for the prosecution was that the first applicant, Abot Gyang, accompanied by the second applicant, Pam Nafam, set out on the night of the 8th March, 1954, with the intention of stealing a goat, that they selected the deceased man's premises to break into, that while the first applicant was trying to dig a hole in the wall of the compound with a piece of iron he had taken with him they were is surprised by the deceased who knocked the first applicant over and held him Ii down, that a struggle then ensued and that while the deceased was holding the I first applicant down on the ground the latter called out and the second applicant, who appears to have run a short distance away, returned and stabbed the deceased several times with a knife thus effecting the release of his companion and they both then ran away.

According to Dr. McLelland, whose deposition taken at the preliminary inquiry was put in evidence, there were five incised wounds, the fatal one being a stab wound between the 11th and 12th ribs on the left side of the body which penetrated the abdominal cavity and caused the intestines to protrude.

The first applicant gave a voluntary statement to the police after his arrest on the 9th March, Exhibit “J”, in which he told the story I have already summarised. In that statement he admitted that when they set out on the night in question to steal he was carrying a “small iron” and his companion had a covering cloth and a knife. He gave evidence on oath at the trial during the course of which he repeated much the same story and again, in cross-examination, admitted that his companion was carrying a ..knife at his waist”.

On his own showing the first applicant went out on the night of March 8th in company with another man with the intention .of committing a felony and while he was endeavouring to effect his escape in a struggle with the deceased his companion came to his aid and stabbed the deceased until he collapsed and they then made their escape.

In the light of his statement, exhibit “J” , and the other evidence there was, in our view, nothing that could usefully be said in favour of the first applicant and we, therefore, refused his application for leave to appeal.

The second applicant gave a statement to the police after his arrest in which he denied having had anything to do with the crime, and at the close of the case for the prosecution at the trial the only admissible evidence against him, the first applicant's statements to the police and to the seventh prosecution witness not being admissible as evidence in so far as he was concerned, was, firstly, the evidence of the twelfth prosecution witness, Hwok Du, wife of the first applicant, who testified that the second applicant was a frequent visitor to their house and that on the night in question she was at home and heard the second applicant talking to her husband outside the house and that they then appeared to her to leave together, and secondly, the fact that the Kano cloth he was wearing on the morning of the 9th March when the police went to his house and arrested him had numerous human blood-stains on it which he alleged were cam-wood dye stains. There was also the fact that in his statement to the police, exhibit “K”, the second applicant denied knowing where the first applicant's house was.

At the close of the case for the prosecution the learned trial Judge ruled, on a submission by counsel who appeared for the defence of both accused that a prima facie case had not been made out against the second accused, that there was a prima facie case for him to answer.*Page 586Counsel then announced that the second accused would no longer participate in the case and that he was closing it. He then proceeded to call the first accused who gave evidence, to which I have already referred, implicating the second accused in the crime.

We considered it unfortunate that the same counsel appeared for both men because their cases obviously conflicted. That being so, and having regard to the other circumstances, we granted leave to appeal to the second applicant and assigned counsel to act on his behalf.

Counsel for the appellant strongly urged that the learned trial Judge erred in ruling that there was a prima facie case for the second accused to answer at the close of the case for the prosecution, and that since his counsel then closed his case in so far as the second accused was concerned and called no evidence on his ii behalf, any evidence given by the first accused in his own defence could not be Ii; used against the second accused. He cit-ed the case of Rex v. Akinpelu Ajani and Others (1) in support of this contention.

This argument, however, depends upon the correctness of the contention that the trial Judge was wrong in ruling that there was a prima facie case. In our view there was a prima facie case, that is to say the evidence of the wife that the Ii second accused frequently visited their house and that on the night of the murder she heard him in conversation with her husband and that the two men then left together, coupled with the evidence that the Kano cloth he was wearing the following morning had numerous human blood-stains on it, which he alleged were only cam-wood dye stains, to justify the trial Judge holding that there was a case for the second accused to answer.

In these circumstances the evidence given by the first accused which clearly implicated the second accused was admissible against the latter, and since section 177 (2) of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap. 63), provides that ,. where accused persons are tried jointly and any of them gives evidence on his own behalf which incriminates a co-accused the accused who gives such evidence shall not be considered to be an accomplice “the evidence of the first accused did not, as a matter of law, require corroboration, although, in our view, if corroboration had been necessary it is to be found in the evidence of the wife and of the blood stained cloth.

Counsel also urged that the second accused was gravely prejudiced by reason of the fact that one counsel represented both accused at the trial, and that we ought to hold that it occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

As I have-already observed, we are of the opinion that they ought to have been separately represented, and we trust that in future in cases such as this where it is apparent that the defences conflict that steps will be taken to ensure that they are separately represented. After careful consideration, however, we came to the conclusion that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred in this case by reason of the procedure complained of.

Counsel for the appellant also criticised other aspects of the evidence, but it is clear from the judgment of the learned trial Judge that he very carefully weighed and considered the evidence and we are satisfied that he came to a correct conclusion on it.

For these reasons we dismissed the appeal of the second accused, Pam Nafam.

Application of accused No.1 for leave to appeal refused.

Appeal of accused No.2 dismissed.

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