Windsor-Aubrey, J. This is an appeal against the judgment of the Land Court which, as counsel agree, gave judgment against the appellant in his representative capacity as the administrator of the estate of William Taylor, deceased, late of Accra. The suit concerns the sale to the respondent of a piece of land situate at Adabraka, Accra.
In the Gold Coast, only the personal estate of a deceased persons vests in an administrator, consequently in that capacity the appellant had no power to effect a sale.
Shortly put, the facts as found by the trial Judge, the correctness of which has not been seriously challenged, are as follows:- By an indenture of conveyance dated the 20th July, 1935, the appellant, acting under a power of attorney granted to him by A. B. Taylor sold the land to one S. K. Ollennu for the sum of £55.
The appellant on the ground that the full purchase money had not been paid appeared to treat the conveyance as of no legal effect, and subsequently as the administrator of the personal estate of W. Taylor sold the same property to the respondent for the sum of £180 by an indenture of conveyance dated the 1st July, 1949.
The respondent erected a fence round the property, which led to the institution f proceedings against him by the original purchaser, S. K. Ollennu. In those proceedings the said S. K. Ollennu produced a receipt for the full purchase price f the property, and therefore the respondent, acting on the very proper advice f his counsel, consented to judgment against himself with costs.
In the proceedings now on appeal the said S. K. Ollennu was called on behalf the respondent and again produced the receipt for £55. The appellant gave evidence at all, and naturally the trial Judge accepted the receipt at its face value and gave judgment for the respondent for £362 1s. 0d., being the purchase price of £180 and sundry expenses including the costs of the former action in which respondent had consented to judgment.
It is argued on behalf of the appellant that as an administrator of personal the he was acting outside the scope of his authority in purporting to convey estate and, therefore, that judgment against him in his representative capacity cannot be upheld.
This seems to me to be correct, but it remains to consider whether judgment would have been given against him person~llyas under rule 36 of W.A.C.A. Rules, 50, this Court has power to make an order within the competence of the trial Court.
The defendant as administrator entered into the usual covenants for title and peaceful and quiet enjoyment.
In the 20th edition of Chitty on contracts at page 1122 the following proposition law is set out”
One who expressly or impliedly warrants that he has the authority of another is liable for breach of warranty of authority to any person to whom the warranty is made and who suffers damage by acting on the faith thereof if in fact he had no much authority.”
exactly covers the circumstances of this case, and I consider the Land Court would have given judgment against the defendant personally. In the circumstances I would dismiss this appeal, but in exercise of the powers conferred on Court to which I have already referred I would amend the judgment of the d Court by giving judgment against the appellant personally instead of t him as administrator of the estate of William Taylor of Accra. As the respondent has been substantially successful on this appeal I would award him costs thereof.
Foster-Sutton, P. I concur. Coussey, I.A. I concur.
Appeal dismissed; judgment amended.