Lucie-Smith, C.J. In this action the plaintiff-appellant claimed to be the rightful person to administer the personal properties of one Yaw Simine (deceased) as against the defendants-respondents.
The learned trial Judge found that the matter had already been dealt with in the Asantehene's Court (this should read Kumasi Divisional Council) on the 28th of April, 1947, and entered Judgment for the defendants-respondents.
The case is one of a series in which the appellant is apparently seeking to prove his overlordship of the Stool of Mem, and thereby acquire certain properties.
The members of the Divisional Council above referred to gave individual reasoned decisions and in the result non-suited the appellant. Their decision was upheld by the Acting Chief Commissioner, Ashanti.
The decision of the Divisional Council was that Simine, deceased, was not a subject of the plaintiff-appellant. The plaintiff-appellant herein raised the same issue in the Divisional Courts as was raised by him in the Divisional Council, viz., was Simine, deceased, his, the plaintiff's, subject.
In the Divisional Council the parties were the same as in this Court. The doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam is fully discussed in the case of Chief Kweku Assampong v. Kweku Amuaku 6- 0,.5. (1) at pp. 196 et seq. We would also refer to the case of Rentit Ltd. v. Duffield (2). In the words of Phipson on Evidence (8th Edition) p. 410:- “It is now settled that when once a given fact has been put in issue and decided between the parties, It will conclude them and their privies from re-litigating such fact in any subsequent proceeding, although brought for a different purpose or object.”
To quote from Spencer Bower on res judicata, at pp. 10 and 11:- “A res judicata is a judicial decision, pronounced by a judicial tribunal “It is enough if the alleged judicial tribunal can properly be described as a person, or body of persons, exercising judicial functions by statute or otherwise in accordance with the law of England whether he, or they, be invested with permanent jurisdiction to determine all causes of a t certain class as and when submitted, or be clothed by the State, or the disputants, with merely temporary authority to adjudicate on a particular dispute, or group of disputes.”
Again at p. 16:-
“19. Lastly, every domestic forum, that is to say, any arbitrator, or arbitrators, or other person or body of persons (by whatever name called) who may be invested with judicial authority to hear and determine a particular dispute, or class of disputes, by the consent of the disputants, or by an order of court, or by a provision of a statute, is undoubtedly a judicial tribunal “ and its awards are as conclusive and unimpeachable (unless and until set aside on any of the recognised grounds) as the decisions of any of the constituted courts of the realm.
“20. It will be gathered from what has been stated, and on reference to the authorities cited, (in paragraphs 15-19) that the decision of the very lowest civil tribunal is, if conclusive at all, conclusive in the very highest, with this exception, that, if a party fails in an inferior civil court on the sole I: ground of its want of jurisdiction, he is not liable to be met by a plea of estoppel in any subsequent proceedings in respect of the same cause of action before a higher court invested with the jurisdiction which the inferior court lacked.”
The case of Hill v. Clifford (3) is authority for saying that the General Medical Council is a “judicial tribunal”. See also Barrs v. Jackson (4) where it was held that a finding by a Spiritual Court was conclusive in a suit in a Court of Chancery-the two suits being between the same parties. The older authorities are discussed in that case by the Lord Chancellor-Lord Lyndhurst. Ordinance 2 of 1940 “An ordinance to amend the Native Authority (Ashanti) Ordinance” defines the Divisional Council as being the Native Authority appointed for a division when composed of the head chief, chiefs and councilors, and in respect of the Kumasi Division means the Asantehene with the chiefs and councillors of that Division.
Section l1A of the same amended ordinance gives a Divisional Council jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause, matter, question or dispute of a constitutional nature arising within the area of such Divisional Council in which the parties are members of or subject to the jurisdiction of such Divisional Council.
In our opinion the Kumasi Divisional Council is a “judicial tribunal “ and its decision as to the status of Simine vis-a-vis the plaintiff-appellant can be raised as estoppel per rem judicatam.
The appeal is dismissed with costs assessed at £14 8s. 0d.
Appeal dismissed.