Foster-Sutton, P. The plaintiff claimed, firstly, a declaration that she was entitle to continue to occupy an area of land, measuring approximately 100 paces by 50 paces, being a portion of a plot of land known as “ Barriers land “, situate Albreda in the Western Division of the Gambia, and secondly, compensation in the sum of £400 4s. 0d., which she alleged were expenses incurred during the years 1945 to 1949 in connection with the clearing of the land plaintiff claimed that she was an indigene within the meaning of the Protectorate Lands Ordinance, 1945, that in the year 1945 the then Governor, Sir Hilary Blood, had, with the agreement of the Chief of the district, promised her the land in question, that pursuant to such agreement she occupied the land, cleared it and planted crops thereon, and that in the year 1951 she was wrongfully dispossessed of the land by the Native Authority of the district in which the land is situate.
The defendants alleged that the plaintiff was a non-indigene within the meaning of the Protectorate Lands Ordinance, 1945, that she had not obtained the consent of the Native Authority of the district for her occupation of the land, and that no memorandum of the terms of such occupation had been drawn up and entered in the Division Land Register in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the Ordinance. Alternatively, they claimed that if she was an indigene the land is vested in the Native Authority and her occupation of it was governed by the customary laws obtaining in the locality. They maintained that in either case her occupation of the land had been lawfully terminated by the Authority of the area in accordance with the customary law, and that she was not entitled to any compensation.
The Protectorate Lands Ordinance provides, inter alia, that the occupation and use of Protectorate land by indigenes shall be governed and regulated by the customary laws obtaining in the localities in which such lands are situated that no Protectorate land shall be occupied by a non-indigene unless he has first obtained the consent of the Authority of the district, and that any non- indigene who occupies any Protectorate Land without the approval of the Divisional Commissioner shall be deemed to be a tenant-at-will. Sub-section (3) of section 6 of the Ordinance provides that where a non-indigene has occupied land with the consent of the Authority concerned and with the approval of the Divisional Commissioner, and no lease has been executed by the Authority as lessor and the non-indigene as lessee, a memorandum of the terms of such occupation containing the particulars set out in paragraphs (a) to (e) of the sub-section shall be drawn up and entered in the Division Land Register. It was not in dispute that the land in question is Protectorate Land within the meaning of the Ordinance.
In answer to questions put to her in cross-examination in connection with her claim to be an indigene the plaintiff said, ..My father was Elijah Melbury. He came from Bathurst. He was an Oku, a general name for people from Nigeria. My mother was the same; all Oku people”, and she then went on to say that she did not regard herself as an Oku person. Since an indigene is defined in the Ordinance as meaning a person whose parents are or were members of some tribe or tribes indigenous to the Protectorate, and she is not the holder of a certificate under paragraph (b) of the definition, there can be no doubt that the learned trial Judge was right in holding, as he did, that the plaintiff is a non-indigene. The plaintiff admitted that the action required to be taken by section 6 (3) of the Ordinance in the case of a non-indigene who has occupied land with the consent of the Authorities had not been taken, but the learned trial Judge found as a fact that she had occupied the land with the requisite consent and approval and I am in no doubt as to the correctness of that finding. After discussing the implications of the admission and his finding the trial Judge goes on in his judgment to say, but what was her tenure? a non-indigene cannot hold under terms of customary tenure but I see nothing to prevent a non-indigene holding under comparable terms” , and he came to the conclusion that she was a tenant-at-will.
Having made that finding, however, he went on to hold that as “section 15 of the Ordinance provides that in the case of such a tenancy the reversion to all fixtures, including fences and all economic trees shall be in the Authority of the District”, and the Authority had the right under the Ordinance to terminate the tenancy, the plaintiff could not succeed under either head of her claim, and he accordingly gave judgment for the defendants.
In view of the finding that the plaintiff, having obtained the consent and approval required by sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 6 of the Ordinance, was lawfully in occupation of the land, I am of the opinion that the learned trial Judge erred in holding that she was a “tenant-at-will.” within the meaning of Ordinance, and that section 15 therefore applies, because a person is only deemed to be a tenant-at-will for the purposes of the Ordinance if he is a non- indigene who has occupied Protectorate Land without the approval of the Divisional Commissioner, which is not the position here.
Nufun Taal, the Alkali of Juffure, was called as a witness for the defendants and he gave the following evidence: “When District Authority allows anyone to occupy land and wants it back again we have to refund the person's expenses and him to go away. They should refund his expenses. That is what we do as a custom “. I agree with the conclusion reached by the learned trial Judge that plaintiff was lawfully in occupation of the land and I am satisfied that the evidence justified his view that her occupation was properly terminated, but, as I have already indicated, I am of the opinion that he was wrong in holding that section 15 of the Ordinance applies in this case, and that in view of the evidence custom the plaintiff is entitled to some compensation by way of a “refund of expenses”.
Her claim for £400 4s. 0d. is based on exhibit “A” which she stated was made by her “because someone wanted to share the land for buying and shipping groundnuts”, and, according to evidence tendered by the defendants which accepted by the learned trial Judge, is greatly inflated. He states in his judgment that if he had to fix a figure it would be the sum of £50, and that is amount I think the plaintiff ought to be awarded.
I would, therefore, vary the judgment of the Court below by giving the plaintiff judgment on her claim for compensation in the sum of £50. That portion of the judgment which dismisses her claim for a declaration to stand, and in view of the fact that long before this case came to trial the first defendant made an offer to her without prejudice of an ex gratia payment of £72 by way of compensation, and of the fact that she has only succeeded on a portion of her claim, I would no order as to costs in the Court below and no order as to costs on this appeal.
Coussey J .A. I concur. Miles, J. I concur.
Judgment varied: compensation allowed.