KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA, AND PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST.
1. The answer to the first question submitted is “No.”
2. In regard to the second question, the answer turns upon the question whether the right which the plaintiff had up to January 1933, to go to the Circuit Court to enforce his right to recover moneys from the defendant is a right acquired, accrued or incurred within the meaning of section 18 (2) (c) of the Interpretation Ordinance, 1933. We are of opinion that it is not (Abbott v. The Minister for Lands, 1895, A.C. 425). This case is within the general rule of law that, while rights are not statutorily altered retrospectively, procedure is, apart from indications to the contrary, altered retrospectively. (Wright v. Hale, 30 L.J. ex. 40, The Ydun, 1899, Probate Division 236, In re Hale's Patent 90 L.J., Ch., p. 35.)
Our answer therefore to the second question submitted to us is that the right of the plaintiff to recover the amount is to be governed by the present Ordinance enacted in 1932.
MACQUARRIE, J. The question we are asked is :-- 2. Is the right of plaintiff to recover the amount to be governed by the repealed Ordinance of 1927 or by the present Ordinance enacted in 1932?
In the year 1935 the plaintiff instituted a claim in the Circuit Court against the defendant in respect of transactions dated before December 31st, 1932. Plaintiff and defendant are both natives.
Up to that date that claim would be triable in the Circuit Court. But the new Ordinance coming into force on the 1st January, 1933, gave native Courts jurisdiction in such cases, thus removing them from the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. The plaintiff claims nevertheless that his action is triable in the Circuit Court.
Mr. Betts for plaintiff contended that, by section 13 (2) (c) of the Interpretation Ordinance, the right of action which plaintiff had up to 31st December, 1932, is not effective by the repeal of the old Ordinance.
He cited a number of English cases which, however, are all cases where there had been some proceedings taken before new legislation or else, like the case of Hale's Patent, of exceptional procedure, and depending also upon the legislation dealing with it or like Henshall v. Porter, 1923, 2 K.B. 193, where a cause of action was in question.
In my opinion the contention rests upon a misconception of the meaning of the right. Had the plaintiff sued before the new Ordinance, he would have had no choice but to sue in the Circuit Court. He had a right to go to that Court, but equally he had no other Court to go to. He took no action at all before the new Ordinance and now wishes to act as though there had been no alteration in the law. That alteration does not affect his right to sue but does alter the tribunal to which he has to go.
In addition to the cases referred to in the judgment just read I would refer to the judgment of Atkin, L.J., in Gell v. White, 1922, 2 K.B., at p. 431, where he says “it is obvious that that provision (of the Interpretation Act) was not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act.” It seems to me the right of plaintiff to go to the Circuit Court before the new Ordinance was such an abstract right.
I agree therefore that the answer to the question should be that the plaintiff's right to recover is governed by the present Ordinance.