KOFI AMOFA
V.
THE QUEEN

Foster-Sutton, P. The appellant in this case was convicted on five counts of falsifying, in each case, a fire-arm licence contrary to section 396 of the Criminal Code.

The case was tried by Jackson, J., assisted by three assessors. The learned trial Judge and all the assessors came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty on all counts, and he was duly convicted and sentenced to nine months imprisonment with hard labour on each count, the sentences to run consecutively, making a total of three years and nine months' imprisonment with hard labour.

Only one ground was raised on this appeal, that is to say, that the learned trial Judge “failed to direct himself and the assessors adequately or at all on the question of mens rea necessary to constitute the offence under the section” .

The section under which the appellant was charged reads as follows:- “Every public officer who intentionally and unlawfully destroys, injures, falsifies, or conceals any document which is in his possession, custody, or control, or to which he has access by virtue of his office, shall be liable to imprisonment for two years.”

In each case the learned trial Judge found as a fact that the appellant falsified a fire-arm import licence, to quote him, “intentionally and unlawfully”. There was, in out view, abundant evidence to support such findings.

In order to determine whether mens rea; that is to say, a guilty mind or intention, is an essential element of the offence charged, it is necessary to look at the object and terms of the law which creates the offence.

It seems clear to us that the legislature thought it so important to prevent the destruction, injury, falsification or concealment by public officers of documents under their custody or control, or to which they have access by virtue of the office they hold, that it intended absolutely to forbid it to be done, “intentionally and unlawfully”. That being so, the prosecution, in our opinion, discharged the onus of proof which was upon it, when it proved, as it did in this case--firstly, that the appellant was a public officer, secondly, that the appellant intentionally^{*Page 239}and unlawfully falsified the documents mentioned in each count, and, thirdly, that he had access to such documents by virtue of his office.

In these circumstances we are of the opinion that this appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.