Foster-Sutton, P. This is an appeal from a decision of Ragnar-Hyne, J., by which he held that the appellant, Kwesi Enimil, by remaining in possession of certain land, commonly known as the Bortogina lands, after a Writ of Possession had, on the 4th March, 1950, been executed in respect of such land, was guilty of contempt of Court. The appellant was fined £50, ordered to pay 25 guineas costs and directed to obey the Order of the Court, dated 23rd February, 1950, by which he was directed to deliver up possession of the land in question, to the present respondents.
The Writ of Possession in this case was obtained by the respondents as a result of their succeeding in an action brought by them against the appellant in which they claimed, in effect, for a declaration that they were entitled to possession, as against him, of the Bortogina lands. The judgment in that suit was delivered on the 24th April, 1948, and it was affirmed, on appeal, by this Court on the 3rd February, 1950. The appellant obtained conditional leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the 27th February, 1950, and final leave was granted on the 22nd June, 1950.
During the hearing of the application for final leave an application by the appellant for a stay of execution was also mentioned and upon Mr. Larbl, on behalf of the respondents, stating that he was prepared to give an undertaking that the respondents would not take possession of any further portion of the land Mr. Williams, for the appellant, stated that he would accept the undertaking and withdraw the application for a stay of execution:
before us it was admitted that the appellant and the other persons he represented were still in occupation of the land in dispute when final leave to appeal was granted on the 22nd June, 1950, and that the description in the writ of Possession, executed on 4th March, 1950, embraced the whole area of land.
The motion calling upon the. appellant to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt was filed on 2nd September, 1950. The hearing took place on various dates between the 26th October, 1950 and 1st February, 1951, and, as I have already indicated, the learned trial Judge delivered judgment on 3rd February, 1951.
In the Court below the appellant’s case was conducted on the footing that he was not at Bortogina on the 4th March, 1950, when it was alleged that the Writ Possession was executed, and I am of the opinion that this dispute obscured the real issue which the Court had to determine. The evidence as to his being present was overwhelming and the learned trial Judge so found.
A motion to show cause why a person should not be committed for contempt Court is an application affecting the liberty of the subject and is always regarded by the Courts as a matter strictissimi juris.
Where an alleged contempt arises from the breach of an order made in favour of a party, as is the case here, it is a good answer if it can be shown that the party complaining of the contempt has waived it, although such a defence would not, of course, avail a person charged with criminal contempt.
In this case it seems to me necessary that we should carefully consider the undertaking given by Mr. Larbi upon the hearing of the appellant’s application for final leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee, resulting, as it did, in Mr. Williams withdrawing his application for a stay of execution.
While it is true that Mr. Larbi said “Writ of Possession has been partially executed, prepared to give undertaking that respondents will not take possession of any further portions of the land”, it is also the case that the Writ of Possession included the whole area of the land in dispute and the appellant and the people he represented were still in occupation of it. That being so, although technically the respondents had taken legal possession of the land, they were not in occupation of any of it, and I am of the opinion that the appellant was entitled to assume that the respondent did not intend to take possession in fact. In other words that the respondents were prepared to maintain the status quo until the result of the appeal to the Judicial Committee became known. The fact that the respondent apparently had no such intention does not, I think, affect the issue before us. It is sufficient if a reasonable man might have been misled.
It is true that the Writ of Possession was executed on the 4th March, 1950, and that the appellant ought to have vacated the land forthwith, but he and the others he represents had lived on the land in dispute over a long period of years and it would, in my view, be right to allow them a reasonable period in which to vacate the land before treating him as being in contempt. Moreover, he had obtained conditional leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee five days before the Bailiff went on the land and read the Writ of Possession. There is the further fact that the appellant obtained final leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee on 22nd June, 1950, and the respondents, through their Counsel, gave an under- taking which, in my opinion, could reasonably be construed as a promise to take no further steps until the Judicial Committee’s decision was made known.
In all the circumstances, including the fact that the appellant has repeatedly stated, both personally and through his Counsel, that he had no intention of defying the order of the Court, I am unable to agree with the conclusion to which the learned trial Judge came.
It follows that I would allow this appeal, direct that the fine of £50 be repaid to the appellant by the Treasury, and order the respondents to repay to the appellant the sum of twenty-five guineas paid. by the latter to the former in respect of the costs in the Court below. This will result in both sides bearing their own costs in the Court below, but in the circumstances I think that equitable.
The costs of the appeal will be fixed at £31 13s. 0d., to be paid by the respondents to the appellant. During the course of the arguments before us we were informed that the parties have now reached an amicable settlement of their differences. It is not, therefore, necessary for us to make any other consequential order.
Coussey, J. I concur. Korsah, J. I concur.
Appeal allowed: order set aside.