Verity, Ag. P. This is an application for special leave to appeal from an order of the Land Court, Accra, refusing in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to re-list an appeal therein from the decision of a Native Court which had been struck out for want of prosecution. It is conceded that the order against which special leave to appeal is sought is an interlocutory order.
By section 2OC of the Courts Ordinance (Cap. 4) (as amended by section 6 of the Courts (Amendment} Ordinance, 1944, it is provided that:-
Any party aggrieved by a decision of the Land Court exercising its original or any appellate jurisdiction, may appeal to the West African Court of Appeal in like manner and subject to the like conditions as if the appeal were an appeal to the West African Court of Appeal from a Divisional , Court exercising its original jurisdiction.”
By section 3 of the West African Court of Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 5), it is provided that:-
“An appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from a Divisional Court (sitting in its original jurisdiction) . . . by special leave of the Court making the order, but not otherwise, from all interlocutory orders and decisions. . . .”
The effect of these two enactments is that an appeal lies from an interlocutory order of a Land Court, whether in its original or appellate jurisdiction, only by special leave of that Court. No such leave has been obtained in the present case, but application therefore has been made to this Court.
Counsel for the applicant sought to ground this application upon Rule 13 of the West African Court of Appeal Rules, 1950, as enabling him to come to this Court for the necessary leave. This rule makes provision for the procedure to be adopted when special leave to appeal is sought from this Court, but has in my opinion, no reference to applications for special leave when this leave is required from the Court below. It has no bearing upon the present case, which is one in which it is required by statute that the leave of the Court making the order shall be obtained as a condition precedent to the right of appeal.
The submission of Counsel that there appears to be a conflict between the provisions of the Ordinance and those of the Rules in this regard, is in my opinion misconceived. Section 3 of the Ordinance is concerned with the substantive right of appeal and determines when and under what conditions an appeal shall lie. Rule 13 is concerned merely with the procedure in matters to which it relates, that is to say, the method .whereby special leave may be sought from this Court in cases in which the leave of this Court is required. It is, therefore, only applicable in such cases and has no application to cases in which leave is to be sought from the Court making the order against which it is desired to appeal. The Ordinance provides that an appeal shall lie only by leave in certain cases and prescribes from which Court leave shall be sought. The rule prescribes the procedure to be followed in those cases only in which leave is to be sought from this Court and has no bearing whatever upon the right of appeal or upon the statutory requirement that in such cases as the present an appeal lies only by special leave of the Court below.
In my opinion, therefore, there can be no doubt that Rule 13 has no application to the present proceedings in which no leave is required or can be granted by this Court, and the motion should therefore be dismissed with costs.
Lewey, J.A. I agree. Morgan, J. I agree.
Motion dismissed.