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Price v Easton

(1833) JELR 80183 (CA)

Court of Appeal 17 Jan 1833 United Kingdom
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Case Details

Judges:Patteson j,Denman C.J, Littledale J,Taunton J.
Other Citations:(1833) 4B and AD 433

PRICE V. EASTON 4 B. and AD. 431.

JOHN PRICE against EASTON.

Thursday, January 17th, 1833,

Fact

Declaration stated that W. P. owed the plaintiff 131pounds., and that in consideration thereof, and that W. P., at the defendant's request, had promised defendant to work for him at certain wages, and also, in consideration of W. P. leaving the amount which might be earned by him in the defendant's hands, he, the defendant, undertook and promised to pay the plaintiff the said sum of 131pounds. Averment, that W. P. performed his part of the agreement. Judgment arrested, because the plaintiff was a stranger to the consideration.

[S. C. 1 N. and M. 303; 2 L. J. K. B. 51. Approved, v. Pitcher, [1904] 2 Ch. 308.]

Declaration stated that one William Price was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of 131., being the balance of a larger sum due for the price of a certain timber carriage sold and delivered to him; and that the defendant, in consideration thereof, and in consideration that the said William Price, at the request of the defendant, had undertaken and faithfully promised the defendant to work for him, the defendant, at certain wages agreed upon between them, and in consideration of William Price leaving the amount which might be earned by him in the defendant's hands, he, the defendant, undertook and promised to pay the plaintiff the sum of 131. Averment that William Price did work for the defendant, and earned a large sum of money, and left the same in his, defendant's, hands. Breach, non-payment to the plaintiff of 131. Plea, non-assumpsit. The plaintiff having obtained a verdict, a rule nisi was obtained by Campbell for arresting the judgment, on the ground that the plaintiff was a mere stranger to the consideration ; and he cited Bourne v. Mason (1 Vent. 6), and Crow v. Rogers (1 Str. 592); and distinguished the case from Dutton v. Poole (2 Lev. 210), where tenant in fee-simple being about to cut down timber for his daughter's portion, the defendant, his heir at law, in consideration of his forbearing so to do, promised to pay a sum of money to the daughter, and the action by the husband of the daughter was held to be well brought; but there, it [434] was said, there was privity by blood, and the daughter was prejudiced by loss of her portion.

Justice now shewed cause. After verdict, it will be intended that every thing necessary to support the action was proved. An act from which the defendant receives a benefit, and from which inconvenience arises to the plaintiff, is a sumcient consideration to support an assumpsit. Here there was an advantage to the defen dant, for he bad the benefit of the labour of William Price, and was not bound to pay for it until the 31st of March. Starkey v. Mylne (1 Roll. Abr. 32, pl. 13), Disborne v. Denabie (1 Roll. Abr. 31, pl. 5), and Wilson v. Coupland (5 B. and A. 228), shew, that where there is a privity between the three parties, assumpsit is maintainable without an immediate consideration from the plaintiff to the defendant. In Dutton v. Poole (2 Lev. 210), and Curtis v. Collingwood (I Ventr. 297), there was no such consideration proceeding immediately from the plaintiff to the defendant.

Patteson J.

No promise to the plaintiff is alleged ; but merely a promise to pay the plaintiff.]

Denman C.J.

I think the declaration cannot be supported, as it does not shew any consideration for the promise moving from the plaintiff to the defendant.

Littledale J.

No privity is shown between the plaintiff and defendant. This case is precisely like Crow v. Rogers (I Str. 582), and must be governed by it.

Taunton J.

It is consistent with all the matter alleged in the declaration, that the plaintiff may have been entirely ignorant of the arrangement between William Price and the defendant.

Patteson J.

After verdict, the Court can only intend that all matters were proved which were requisite to support the allegations in the declaration, or what is necessarily to be implied from them. Now it is quite clear that the allegations in this declaration are not suffeient to shew a right of action in the plaintiff. There is no promise to the plaintiff alleged. The rule for arresting the judgment must be made absolute.

Rule absolute.

(a) See Cook v. Leonard, 6 B. and C. 351, where several are cited by Bayley J.

(b)see Irving v. Wilson, 4 T. R. 485. Morgan v. Palmer, 2 B. and C. 729.

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