Harragin, C.J. The facts in this case are shortly as follows: The appellant on the day in question went out shooting in the forest at about 6.30 p.m. It was dark. He approached a stream which is used by the villagers for drawing water, and there shot at something which he believed to be an antelope by the water’s edge. Unfortunately, the object which he fired at was, in fact, a man who was killed by the shot. On these facts he was charged with murder before a Judge and jury, but was convicted of manslaughter by negligence and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. It is against this conviction and sentence that he appeals to this Court.
Murder is defined by section 232 of the Crimina1 Code (Cap. 9) as “Whoever causes the of another person by any unlawful harm is guilty of murder unless his crime is reduced to manslaughter by reason of such extreme provocation or other matter of partial as in the next succeeding section is mentioned”.
The next succeeding section deals with certain matters of extenuation which are in no way applicable to this case.
Manslaughter is defined by section 251 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 9) as “whoever causes the death of another person by any unlawful harm is guilty of manslaughter. If the only caused he
Manslaughter by negligence” and section 141 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 10) reads as follows:-
“Every charge shall be deemed to be divisible into the integral parts legally necessary to constitute the offence charged as described in the enactment creating the offence, and if the evidence shows that some integral parts of the offence only are proved, and such parts which are so proved or some of them taken together constitute another offence, the person charged may be convicted of the other offence or of an attempt to commit it.”
It was by virtue of this section that the learned judge directed the jury to the effect that they could convict the appellant of manslaughter or manslaughter by negligence if they were not satisfied that he was guilty of murder.
It is against this direction that the appellant appeals to this Court, stating that on a charge of murder he cannot be convicted of manslaughter by negligence as he was never called upon to defend himself on a charge involving negligence.
One of the first essentials for a conviction on a charge of murder is that the accused person has caused the death “intentionally”, and the second essential is that he should have cause the death by” any unlawful harm” . By the verdict of the jury who, in our opinion, were correctly directed by the learned judge as to the law, the jury found that the appellant had not caused the death intentionally, but that he had done so by an unlawful harm which immediately brings the appellant within the mischief of section 141 of Cap. 10 above quoted. This, in effect, means that the appellant was guilty of manslaughter, but that in view of the fact that the unlawful harm was caused by negligence the gravamen of the charge was reduced For whereas on a conviction for manslaughter the convicted person may be sentenced to life imprisonment, where the manslaughter is caused by negligence the imprisonment cannot exceeds five years.
Section 212 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 9) defines unlawful harm as follows:- “Harm is unlawful which is intentionally or negligently caused without any of the justifications mentioned in Title 7.”
The effect of the jury’s verdict is therefore that they were of the opinion that the appellant caused the death of the deceased by a harm which was caused by negligence.
The next point, therefore, to be considered is the law relating to negligence. Avery able argument has been advance before us based on the law in England relating to negligence of such a degree as to create criminal responsibility and supported by such authorities as Archbold 31st Edition page 882, Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1), R. v. Bateman (2). It was argued that such authorities were binding in the Gold Coast in view of the case of John Oni Akerele v. The king (3).
The fact is that this case was decided with reference to the law in force in Nigeria and not in the Gold Coast, and we can find nowhere in the laws of Nigeria a section which corresponds to section 14 (1) of the Criminal Code (Cap. 9) which reads as follows:-
“A person causes an event negligently if, without intending to cause the event the causes it by voluntary act, done without such skill and precaution as are reasonably necessary under the circumstances, or as he is in the particular case bound by law to have and use, for preventing the event from being caused.”
From this, quotation it will be seen that the law with regard to negligence in the Gold Coast has been defined more widely than is the case in England or Nigeria. In fact it would appear to codify the law relating to civil negligence as it appears in England today rather than criminal negligence.
The case of R. v. Kojo No.1 (4), categorically lays down that that high degree of negligence necessary to establish a charge of manslaughter under English law is not necessary to establish a charge of manslaughter under Cap. 9, sections 231 and 225, and that the degree of negligence necessary to establish a charge of manslaughter in the Gold Coast is laid down by section 14 of the Criminal Code.
Whether or not the time has now arrived when the law in the Gold Coast should be amended to conform with the principles laid down in such cases in England is a matter for the Legislature and not for this Court.
We are of the opinion that the learned Judge correctly directed the jury on the various points of law arising in this case and that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to return the verdict which they did.
The appeal against the conviction is dismissed, but with regard to the sentence, in view of the particular circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it should be reduced to one month and eighteen days to run from the date of conviction which means that the appellant will be discharged as from today.
Appeal allowed. Sentence reduced.