KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA, PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST AND GRAHAM PAUL C.J., SIERRA LEONE. The appellant as the plaintiff in this suit claimed as follows:- “The plaintiff being the tenant and the person entitled to and “actually in occupation and possession of Premises No. N.378A/9 “Adabraka-Accra under a Tenancy Agreement made between the said “plaintiff and Messrs Sowah and Okunor the Caretakers of the said “property for and on behalf of the children of the late R. B. Annan, “deceased to whom the same was devised by the will of the said late “R. B. Annan, deceased, Probate of which will was granted by the “Supreme Court on the 2nd day of April, 1935, contracted with the
“Defendant-Company sometime about November or December, 1939, “as part consideration for the employment or engagement by the “Defendant-Company of him the plaintiff to work as perfume manu- “facturer for the said Company-to give the said Company occupation “of the ground floor of the premises for purposes of their perfumery “manufacturing business-and in accordance with the said contract, “the said plaintiff gave the Defendant-Company possession and occupa- “tion of the said ground floor of the premises.
“The contract of engagement between the plaintiff and the “Defendant-Company has by mutual consent been determined and “brought to an end as from the 31st day of March, 1942, and the “plaintiff has by notice dated the 7th day of April, 1942, demanded “from and required the Defendant-Company to quit from and surrender “and or yield up possession and occupation of the said ground floor of “the premises but the Defendant-Company has refused to comply with “the demand.
“The plaintiff therefore claims from the Defendant-Company “recovery of possession of the said ground floor of the premises No. “N. 378A/9.”
Particulars of defence were filed and the plaintiff filed a reply The Court below gave judgment for the defendants with costs and from that judgment the appellant has appealed to this Court. The first ground of appeal was:- “The Court was wrong in its decision that ‘During the holding “over (under the Lease dated 12th July, 1937, Exhibit 10) no rent was “paid by the plaintiff and therefore he was in law relegated to the “position of a tenant at will--because there was abundant uncon- “tradicted evidence that the plaintiff paid rent and held over as a “tenant-from year to year-before the defendants were let into “possession by the plaintiff.”
It is enough to say in regard to this ground of appeal that we agree with respondent’s counsel’s contention that on a correct view of this case in the light of the findings of fact of the Court below it is immaterial in what character the plaintiff held over before the defendants were let into possession. We see no reason to upset these findings of fact by the Court below.
Grounds 2 and 3 are based on the registered Indenture of Lease granted to the plaintiff on 1st April, 1942, and on the fact that this Indenture was registered under the Land Registration Ordinance (Cap. 112). There does not seem to be any substance in these grounds for the reasons (1) that it is clear from the writ of summons and pleadings that the plaintiff's claim was not based on this Indenture of Lease and (2) that the Land Registration Ordinance on this point deals only with competition and priority as between a registered instrument and other instruments not registered. It in no way deals with competition between a registered instrument and an oral agreement for a lease which is what the defendants found upon.
Ground 4 is as follows: - “That the Court was wrong in its decision that ‘the defendants “were in possession of the premises under an Agreement for Lease and “that they are entitled to remain in possession until the appropriate “notice to determine their tenancy by the Lessors is served on them, “because the evidence adduced by the defendants did not establish that “their possession of the premises was ‘unequivocally referrable’ to “their alleged Agreement for lease within the principle of Hodson v. “Heuland (1896), 2 Ch. page 428.” This is entirely a question of fact and the following findings of fact by the Court below, which we accept, sufficiently dispose of this ground of appeal:- “(1) That Sowah, who alone was actually managing the affairs “connected with the house, did agree to grant a lease of the premises “in question to defendants” and
“(2) That the rents paid by the defendants were not paid on behalf “of the plaintiff and both the plaintiff and Sowah were aware of this.”
During all material times it is clear that the defendants were to the knowledge of the plaintiff in possession of the premises under the oral agreement to grant a lease and that they paid the rent agreed under that oral agreement to the knowledge of the plaintiff.
The last ground of appeal was that “the judgment was entirely against the weight of the evidence.” There was ample evidence upon which, if he believed it, the learned Judge could justifiably come to the conclusions embodied in his judgment. This Court is not prepared to differ from the views of the Court below as to the relative credibility of the material witnesses upon which these conclusions depended.
It is clear that oral agreement for lease founded upon by the defendants has expired and that the defendants are in possession as tenants holding over after the expiry of their Agreement for a Lease. The nature of the holding over is a matter between the lessors and the defendants. The lessors are not parties to this suit and the nature and extent of the lessors' or tenants' rights inter re are therefore not matters to be decided in this suit. The position might have been different if the plaintiff in bringing this action had founded upon the registered lease by the lessors to him of 1st April, 1942, but the plaintiff in his pleadings did not base his claim on that lease. If he had done so the defence, evidence, and arguments before the Court might have been different.
Before leaving this case we should like to express the view that it is regrettable that neither the commercial representative of the defendants nor their solicitor took the ordinary common sense precaution of confirming in writing at the outset the terms of the oral agreement for a lease. If this had been done obviously this litigation would never have been necessary.
The appeal is dismissed with costs assessed at £39 Is.