JUDGMENT
ACKAAH-BOAFO JSC:
i. Overview
[1] My Lords, having regard to the facts presented in this interlocutory appeal, which arises from a petition for divorce filed by the Petitioner, and the question for our determination, I consider it appropriate to commence my opinion with the old statement of law by Scrutton L.J. in Hyman v. Hyman; Hughes v. Hughes, to the effect that:
“The stability of the marriage tie, and the terms on which it should be dissolved, involve far wider considerations than the will or consent of the parties to the marriage. The Court does not, as other Courts do, act on mere consents or defaults of pleading, or mere admissions by the parties.”
[2] I understand the above statement to mean that, in a divorce petition, even where both parties agree to separate or admit certain facts, the court will not automatically grant a decree of divorce merely because such an agreement exists. This is because marriage constitutes a legal status with public consequences, and its diss…