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WILLIAMS AND ANOTHER
V.
WELLINGBOROUGH BOROUGH COUNCIL

(1975) JELR 80320 (CA)

Court of Appeal 3 Jul 1975 United Kingdom
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Judges:Russell, Stamp and Browne L.JJ.
Counsel:Sharpe Pritchard & Co. for G. v. Baguley, Wellingborough Borough Council; Maxwell, Batley & Co. for Smith & Chamberlain, Wellingborough. L. G. S.
Other Citations:1975] 1 W.L.R. 1327

 RUSSELL L.J(reading the judgment)The plaintiffs in this case were tenants of a council house from the defendant council. Under the Housing Act 1957, coupled with directions from the appropriate Minister, the council was enabled to sell the house to the plaintiffs at something less than market value, on terms that during the first five years the council had the right of pre-emption at the sale price if the plaintiffs wanted to sell – coupled, of course, with a restriction against the plaintiffs selling it above that price during the first five years. This, of course, was so that a tenant so purchasing at a reduced price should not be able to make a quick profit by resale. Additionally, the council was entitled to accept, in satisfaction of the purchase price, an instalment mortgage of nearly the whole purchase price, repayable with interest over, I believe, some 30 years. Under this system, the defendant council sold to the plaintiffs their house in November 1972 for £5,300, leaving £5,030 on instalment mortgage by way of legal charge on the restrictive terms as to resale in the first five years that I have summarised. The mortgage conferred a power of sale on default in payment of instalments, and I extract from the legal charge the following provisions: “Provided further that in case the borrower shall..........be in default for one month in payment of any interest or other moneys herein covenanted to be paid by the borrower ... then in any such case the whole of the moneys payable or to become payable hereunder shall be deemed to be forthwith due and owing and the council may at any time thereafter without any previous notice to or concurrence on the part of the borrower ... exercise the power of sale ... conferred upon mortgagees by the Law of Property Act 1925. “ I observe that that was the only power of sale conferred upon the defendant council. The plaintiffs, in circumstances I need not advert to, defaulted in payment of the due instalments, and the defendant council purported to exercise their power of sale. The only document relating to that is a registered land transfer, identifying the property, dated June 3, 1974. It says: “In consideration of £5,300 (the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged) and in exercise of the power of sale conferred by the charge dated November 20, 1972, and registered on February 6, 1973, the borough council of Wellingborough of Council Offices, Wellingborough ... hereby as mortgagee ... transfers to the borough council of Wellingborough aforesaid the land comprised in the title above mentioned discharged from the said charge.” The common seal of the borough council was affixed to that in the presence of Mr. Northen, the mayor, and Mr. Baguley, secretary and solicitor. It is to be observed that the stated figure of £5,300 did not exceed the amount then outstanding on the mortgage. Pennycuick V.-C. has held that document to be a nullity. Now, as I have remarked, the only power of sale incorporated in the mortgage, and thereby conferred upon the defendant council, was section 101 (1) (i) of the Law of Property Act 1925, which is in these terms: “A mortgagee, where the mortgage is made by deed, shall, by virtue of this Act, have the following powers, to the like extent as if they had been in terms conferred by the mortgage deed, but not further (namely): (i) A power, when the mortgage money has become due, to sell, ... the mortgaged property, ... by public auction or by private contract, ...” I consider there is a very short answer to this appeal. What was done by the council was not, in my view, something which could be described as a sale, whether by public auction or by private contract. It was a mere re- taking of the property with (if I may be forgiven the phrase) a see-through dress of a sale for £5,300; and there is not any power merely to re- take the property on a default. I agree with the view of Pennycuick V.-C. that the purported transfer effects nothing; and on that ground would dismiss the appeal. I appreciate that problems are created during the first five years of a transaction such as this, problems in combining a fully effective enforcement of the legal charge with maintenance of the principle that during the first five years the purchasing tenant shall not make a profit on any realisation over and above the initial reduced purchase price. But, if it be right to overcome those problems, it must it seems to me be done by the legislature. I am quite unable, by some general implication from the policy of the Housing Act 1957 to dignify during the five-year period that t which the council did as a sale under their power of sale. For those short reasons, I would dismiss this appeal. STAMP L.J. I agree. The words “sale” and “sell” connote a transaction to which there are at least two parties, a seller and a buyer; and, as Lindley L.J. pointed out in Farrar v. Farrars Ltd.(1880) 40 Ch.D. 395, 409, “A sale by a person to himself is no sale at all.” Such a situation is, as I see it, to be contrasted with one where there is at law a sale but the purchaser is subject to a fiduciary or other obligation and the propriety of the transaction of sale is in question. Here, there being no sale, one never reaches the point at which the propriety of what was done falls to be considered. I too would dismiss the appeal. BROWNE L.J. I also agree that this appeal should be dismissed, for the reasons given by Russell and Stamp L.JJ. I do not wish to add anything.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Legal aid taxation.

Leave to appeal refused.


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